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Abstract 
The paper considers price trends as signals for the evaluation of reforms leading to ownership or market 
structure changes in public services. In order to do so, we focus on a specific example: electricity prices in 
four countries, namely UK, France, Germany and Italy. 
We consider that these countries offer a natural experiment in different patterns of public/private 
ownership and liberalisation of electricity industry. We use price changes as a signal and observe that 
there is no clear dominance of one pattern in terms of welfare change for the representative consumer. 
This conclusion tends to reject the widely held idea that one specific “orthodox” pattern should be 
preferred: privatisation with liberalisation and vertical disintegration. The empirical evidence does not 
sustain any strong claim of superiority of such a pattern.  
                                                 
* This text draws from a previous report prepared for CIRIEC (Italy). I am grateful for research assistance 
to Gianni Carbone, Elena Dugnani and Antonio Monaco. Thanks are also due to Prof. Giuseppe Bognetti 
for his useful comments on a previous draft and to the participants in the CIRIEC working group, as well 
as to Ivana Paniccia of the Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas (documentation and 
studies service). However, the author takes sole responsibility for the opinions expressed and for any 
possible remaining error. 
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1. Introduction 
Processes of privatisation, liberalisation and regulation in the field of public utility 
services draw increasing attention to the subject of the performance of the companies. 
This term is a generic one and can have different meanings: the profit rate as a ratio 
between gross or net profit and total asset or equity, the ratio between profits and 
revenue, productivity of capital, of labour, or total factor productivity, cost per unit 
produced, etc.  
 
The choice of each of these indicators leads to specific conceptual measurement 
problems, widely discussed in the literature related to regulation systems, in particular 
with regard to the alternative of a mechanism based on the «RPI-x» criterion or on the 
rate of return.  
 
However, the economic evaluation of the results of a reform in the field of public utility 
services should not depend on these corporate indicators. What should be of interest to 
those who study or plan public policies is the change in the welfare of the various 
agents that has taken place, or could take place, as a result of the reform.  
 
There are considerably fewer studies on the subject than is actually desirable, 
presumably because of the greater difficulty in theoretical welfare analysis and in 
conducting an empirical survey, cf. Megginson, Netter (2001). One of these 
contributions is Galal et al. (1994), a study carried out on behalf of the World Bank on a 
limited sample of cases of privatisation; La Porta and Lopez de Silanes (1999) deal with 
almost all of the companies privatised in Mexico (170 cases, but only a few public 
utility companies); for the case of electricity in the United Kingdom and, more 
generally, about public services cf. Newbery (1999), Newbery, Pollitt (1997), 
Petrazzini, Clark (1996), Boles de Boer, Evans (1996), Domah, Pollitt (2000). Florio 
(2002) offers a comprehensive review. 
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The paper considers price trends as signals for the evaluation of reforms leading to 
changes in public services. In order to do so, we focus on a specific example: electricity 
prices in four countries, namely UK, France, Germany and Italy. 
We consider that these countries offer a natural experiment in different patterns of 
public/private ownership and liberalisation of electricity industry. We use price changes 
as a signal and observe that there is no clear dominance of one pattern in terms of 
welfare change for the representative consumer. 
This conclusion tends to reject the widely held idea that one specific “orthodox” pattern 
should be preferred: namely, privatisation with liberalisation and vertical disintegration. 
The empirical evidence does not sustain any strong claim of superiority of such a 
pattern. Further research is needed to understand why European countries offer 
strikingly different models of industrial organization for the same public service. 
The rest of the paper has the following sections: first, we offer a very brief outline of 
structural differences among electricity industry  in selected European countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and we mention the Scandinavian countries as well; second, we 
present an overview of output and consumption electricity trends in the above 
mentioned four countries; third, we present detailed evidence on price performance and 
energy inputs costs; fifth, we consider other price explanatory variables; eventually, we 
conclude with a simple calculation of welfare changes for the four countries and we 
comment on these findings.  
 
2. Outlines of structural features of electricity industry in selected European 
countries 
 
The study of the effects of specific public services reforms raises important problems of 
empirical welfare analysis. The ability to respond to the problems posed is often beyond 
the possibilities of a single independent scholar, who can only ascertain, with regret, 
that such an analysis is rarely carried out either by the regulators or by independent 
researchers, with a few meritorious and important exceptions (cf. infra).  
 4
For the purpose of illustration, below we shall show how the study of the price trends 
for a public utility service such as electricity, if carried out using time series and 
comparisons between countries challenges popular views about the impact of the 
reforms in Europe. 
What follows does not in any way purport to be a comprehensive study of the problem 
for the sector considered, but merely suggests the need for regulators in different 
countries, for the European Commission and independent observers to initiate more 
exhaustive enquiries on welfare changes than are generally available, a subject we shall 
come back to at the end.  
 
The countries we consider – inevitably very succinctly – are the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Italy, that is the four major member states of the EU. We shall 
also make  some brief reference to the Scandinavian model.  
The structural diversity of the electricity industry in these countries is considerable and 
one issue  we are proposing is to verify whether it is possible to capture this diversity 
through price dynamics, for example confirming the hypothesis that a certain mix of 
privatisation and liberalisation generates sustained reductions in prices.  
 
a) The United Kingdom is obviously the reference case for the restructuring of the 
sector. The structure of the industry is in continuous evolution and what follows 
refers to the period covered by the data that we use for the analysis. For an update 
on the subsequent evolution cf. for example Allen & Overy (2001). 
The United Kingdom is an importer of electricity. In 2000, imports satisfied about 
4% of its requirements. The productive mix comprises roughly 76% fossil fuels and 
the remaining 24% nuclear energy with a negligible percentage of hydroelectric and 
renewable energy sources. 
The Electricity Act of 31 March 1990 saw the launch of the restructuring of the 
British electricity sector that had previously operated in a regime of nationalised 
industry. The reform contemplated the liberalisation and simultaneous privatisation 
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of the two state companies, National Power and Power Gen, and of the network of 
RECs (regional electricity companies). The price of the monopoly services 
(transmission and distribution) was regulated by the price-cap, under the control of 
OFFER, a regulation agency, and later OFGEM, (now GEM, cf. infra) managed by 
a Director General nominated every five years by the minister, who supervises the 
tariffs, prices and quality of the service offered. In the case of disagreements 
between the Director General (DGES) and the operators, the antitrust authority, i.e. 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MCC, now Competition Commission) 
could interven. An Electricity Exchange (Pool) was also set up for the trade of 
electricity and to determine the prices that the RECs should pay producers1.  
The reform of 1990 (partially modified by the Utility Act of 2000) required that 
electricity tariffs be divided into the different cost components: production, 
transmission, distribution, supply and subsidy for nuclear energy. The regulator 
controls the last four of the five components listed, while the production price is 
unrestrained. The tariffs are subdivided into tariffs applied to captive users 
(franchise market) and tariffs applied to free users (non franchise market). Payment 
terms are established by each REC and must be approved by the regulating 
authority. 
The tariffs for captive users, in turn, are divided according to the payment terms 
and the type of tariff. The various types are: standard tariff, day/night tariff, 
day/night controlled circuit tariff and tariffs with only a variable quota.  
The tariffs for free users differ according to whether the annual consumption is 
higher or lower than 60 MWh. If the consumption is lower than the stated threshold 
there are four tariffs (standard, day/night, evening and week-end). If it is higher 
then there are seasonal maximum demand tariffs. 
Recently flat rate tariffs have been announced, which are independent of 
consumption, but based on the number of components of the household and the size 
                                                 
1 In 2001 the Pool was replaced by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). 
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of the home. The new regulation mechanism brought in by the Utility Act of 2000 
further modifies the tariff mechanism. 
The results of liberalisation were not long in coming: the number of companies 
producing electricity increased considerably after 1990, from 6 to 47, also thanks to 
the advent of turbogas technology. Some of the larger ones are National Power, 
PowerGen, Eastern, British Energy, Magnox Electric and two Scottish firms: 
Scottish Power and Hydro-Electric. Nevertheless the largest production companies 
continue to maintain a huge quota of the market and it is believed that in the past 
they had considerable influence on the formation of prices and on the Pool.  
Recently there have been phenomena of re-integration and  expansion: for example 
in 1998 Power Gen (a generating company) acquired EME (East Midlands 
Electricity), the third largest regional electricity company in England and Wales. In 
March 1999 National Power (a generating company) acquired the British gas 
distribution company Calortex, etc. As we have already mentioned, the panorama is 
in continuous evolution and an update on the structural and regulatory scenario can 
be found on the website of the new sector authority, the Gas and Electricity 
Markets Authority (GEMA). The new regulation emphasises the role of the 
authority in protecting the consumers and introduces the Gas and Electricity 
Consumer Council.  
Today, however, the market is totally liberalised. All consumers, domestic and 
business, can choose their own supplier.  
 
b) France can be considered a symmetrical case to Britain. 
France is an exporter of electricity: roughly 16% of the production of EDF, the 
public monopoly, is sold to Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain and Belgium. The 
French situation is also remarkable from the point of view of productive mix: in 
2000 75% of the electricity produced was generated by nuclear plants, 15% came 
from hydroelectric and renewable sources and just 10% from fossil fuels. This 
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situation leads to much lower direct production costs than in the other countries 
under consideration2.  
On 2 March 2000, France approved a law implementing CE Directive no. 96/92 
regarding the liberalisation of the electricity sector, which modified the pre-existing 
structure created by the law of  8 April 1946. With the reform an authority was set 
up to regulate the sector and to check that the efficiency objectives agreed in the 
programme contracts were achieved (direct public control by the Ministries of 
Industry and of Finance).  
The tariffs on the French market are based on three fundamental principles:  
- equality of treatment (customers with the same characteristics must pay the 
same tariffs); 
- invoicing at cost-reflective price (a price is applied to each category of 
consumer that reflects the long term marginal costs of the category itself, 
including a rate of return on capital); 
- the obligation to supply (EDF must at all times satisfy consumers’ demands). 
Tariffs are divided according to the power supplied: 
- blue tariffs (from 3 to 36 kW); 
- yellow tariffs (from 36 to 250 kW); 
- green tariffs (over 250 kW).  
All tariffs also comprise a fixed quota (which depends on the power installed) and a 
variable amount (consumption and period of use during the day and during the 
year). 
As we said, the reform in France has not yet to a major change in the  structure of 
the sector: around 2000 there there still was  a public monopoly or near-monopoly 
(EDF - Electricité de France) operating at all stages (as a vertically integrated 
structure), from generation (85% of the market), to transmission (100%), 
distribution and sales (95%), to single consumers, both domestic and business. As 
                                                 
2 However there is some public concern about the hidden cost of disposal of nuclear residuals. 
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regards generation, in addition to EDF there are also other producers including 
autoproducers (obliged to sell any excess to EDF), distribution cooperatives, state 
railways and so on. Distribution is managed almost entirely by EDF with 5% 
managed by distribution cooperatives (usually for private rural supply). An 
exchange is to be set up in the future to deal in electricity. 
 
c) Germany is only a marginal exporter of electricity. The productive mix includes 
63% fossil fuels, 31% nuclear and the remaining 6% hydroelectric and other 
renewable sources (1999). A gradual move away from nuclear generation is 
foreseen. 
Prior to the reform, the law of 1935 had led to the existence of a de facto regime of 
private regional monopoly with nine vertically integrated supra-regional companies, 
which, in 2000, still controlled 80% of production, 40% of distribution and all 
transmission. Below this oligopolistic level that has been static for decades, a 
regional level operates that is formed of about 80 firms whose principal activity 
consists of acquiring energy from the large distributors and reselling it at a local 
level. About 800 entities operate at a local level, most of them publicly owned. 
80% of sovra-regional generation is controlled by the first level, and only 20% by 
regional and local companies. 
In 1998 (law of 29 April) the Community directives regarding the liberalisation of 
the sector were adopted. The reform anticipated total openness: each consumer 
could choose his own supplier without any limitations or volume threshold. The 
supplier could also be a producer, a regional distribution company or a 
municipalized company.  
An electricity exchange was also set up, but not an independent sector authority. 
Control is, in fact, the direct responsibility of the public administration: the 
Ministry for Economic and Industrial Affairs, regional governments and the 
antitrust authority (Kartellamt). The first deals with energy policy in the broad 
sense, while the regional governments authorise the construction of new power 
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stations, approve tariffs and grant licences for the production, transmission and 
distribution of power. The antitrust authority verifies the tariffs as well.  
For business users the tariffs include a fixed quota according to the maximum 
quantity of contracted power and a variable amount based on the quantity of energy 
consumed and the period of use (peak or not). Up until 1996 the tariff also included 
a compensation tax (which accounted for an average of 8.5% of the final price). 
This guaranteed the use of German coal in the production of electricity and was 
collected by the Federal Office for industrial economy. Special tariffs and 
purchasing obligations are contemplated for the production of energy from 
renewable sources. About 60% of the electricity sold in Germany today is traded on 
the basis of two to three year contracts, while small consumers can enjoy standard 
contracts.  
Regarding the results of the reform, it should be said that it is still difficult to 
evaluate them. On the other hand, liberalisation predominantly affected demand 
and not supply. However, probably Germany is moving towards a much more 
accentuated liberalisation of the sector than France.  
 
d) Italy is a net importer of electricity: roughly 15% of demand is satisfied by imports 
from Switzerland, France, Slovenia and Austria. The current productive mix is the 
result of a political choice (following a referendum) to dismantle nuclear power 
stations: in 2000 78% of electricity was derived from fossil fuels, and 22% was of 
hydroelectric origin or from other renewable sources. 
With regard to the structure of the sector, after a long period of private oligopoly 
Italy changed to a vertically integrated public monopoly (1962). Enel, the public 
sector company, became a Plc in 1992. The adoption of CE Dir. no. 96/92 in March 
1999 brought about the liberalisation of the electricity sector in the production, 
imports, exports, sales and purchasing stages, the deverticalisation of Enel SpA and 
the constitution of a public company to manage the national transmission system 
(GRTN SpA). It was also decided to unify distribution in the urban areas, in cases 
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where the presence of a municipalized company that had survived nationalisation 
had created dualistic solutions (as in the of AEM in Milan). The reform does not 
provide for total openness as it does in Germany: since 2000 those with a 
consumption of over 20 GWh have been able to join the free market, or, within a 
consortium that consumes at least 20 GWh, those who consume at least 1 GWh. 
Since 2002 the threshold has been 9 GWh instead of 20 (the limit remains 1 GWh 
for those belonging to a consortium). If the market were not effectively liberalised 
it will still be possible to lower the eligibility threshold.  
Law 481/95 also provided for the establishment of an Authority for the regulation 
of electricity and gas. Subjects who possess the eligibility requisites may apply to 
the said Authority. The new chosen supplier will have to pay a toll (transit) to use 
the system and related services.  
In January 2001 an electricity exchange was set up, a market place in which to 
make spot purchases of energy or stipulate futures contracts (which is not yet 
operational, but a company has already been set up to manage the market). 
A truly open market situation still does not exist in Italy today: the new suppliers 
can choose the most remunerative customers and thus maintain fairly high price 
levels. Consequently the service can probably benefit only small business users 
with high consumption levels who decide to form a consortium. By the end of 2003 
Enel should be selling off part of its power stations (equivalent of roughly 15,000 
MWh of production), by means of competitive procedures. 
In addition to Enel, the major suppliers who already, or soon will, operate in Italy 
include: AEM Milano, AEM Torino, Dalmine Energy, Edison, Enipower, Energy, 
Merloni Progetto Energy, Sondel, Verbund, ENBW and EDF. 
Documents updating the situation in Italy can be found on the Authority’s website 
(www.autorita.energy.it). 
 
e) These four examples are far from being representative of electricity industry across 
Europe. Particularly, the Scandinavian electricity market has distinctive features.  
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Sweden is a (marginal) net exporter of electricity. The productive mix is affected by 
the peculiar geographical position and hydro-geological nature of the country. In 
1999 47% of energy was produced using renewable sources, a further 47% was of 
nuclear origin and just 6% from fossil fuels.  
In 1996 there was a radical reform in Sweden, with total liberalisation of 
production and a regime of authorisation; transmission was still public, in a 
monopoly regime managed by a non-profit state company, and distribution was 
delegated to 280 municipalized firms.  
In Norway the market has been liberalised since 1991, but state ownership still 
plays a leading role through local distributors and in some cases also public 
producers.  
In the Scandinavian electricity area (which will soon also include Finland), 
liberalisation granted all consumers the freedom to choose their own supplier and in 
1996 established the Nord Pool, the electricity exchange in Oslo where all of the 
Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish firms operate (cf. Amundsen et al., 1998).  
 
As one can see from these very rapid and necessarily incomplete references, in Europe a 
number of electricity market models coexist that are very different from one another 
from the point of view of the regime of ownership, degree of openness, productive 
concentration of the technological mix and the degree of vertical integration. We shall 
now go on to examine output and price trends. 
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3. Output and consumption 
 
We shall begin our discussion by considering production trends. 
Figure 1 –Volume of electricity produced (index figures, 1989=100) 
 
Source: our processing of Eurostat data, Statistiques en bref 1989-1999 
 
Figure 1 shows the output trend of electricity in Italy, Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom between 1989 and 1999. For Italy and France the index rose from 100 in 1989 
to roughly 130 in 1999, while for the UK growth was only half that amount (about 115). 
Germany appeared to buck the trend (production was more or less the same). 
Over the same period there was a change in the mix of sources in the UK: the share of 
energy from fossil fuels fell from 76.1% to 72.4% (and within this, coal input declined 
in favour of gas); nuclear increased from 21.7% to 26%; whilst energy produced from 
renewable sources, which was already marginal, accounted for an even smaller share.  
During this time in Italy the quota of conventional fossil fuels remained stable at around 
80% and, with the absence of nuclear plants, thus so also did the share of hydroelectric 
and renewable energy sources (20%). There was a sizeable readjustment in Italy when 
the nuclear plants were abandoned: between 1986 and 1989, in addition to an increase 
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of 10% in total production of electricity, there was an increase in the quota of fossil 
fuels (from 69% to 80%) and a reduction in the hydroelectric (from 25% to 20%).  
In Germany the proportions were basically constant for the whole period: roughly two 
thirds conventional fossil fuels, 30% nuclear and the rest renewable sources.  
In France there were no great changes in the productive mix: the nuclear sector claimed 
the lion’s share with 75% (constant over the period), the hydroelectric sector increased 
slightly (from 12% to 15%) at the expense of fossil fuels (down from 12% to 9%). 
 
Our point here is not to discuss the different trends in production in the countries 
mentioned, that is something which would require a supply and demand model, 
considering – amongst other things – that as said above the UK and Italy are net 
importers, while France and Germany are net exporters. We shall limit ourselves to 
observing that the differing degrees of liberalisation do not seem to be very important in 
interpreting the different trends in production. Furthermore, the huge change in the mix 
of energy sources as a result of the restructuring of the British industry was not 
accompanied by more sustained production dynamics than in other countries where the 
source structure remained virtually unchanged. What is striking is the diversity in 
technological pattern in the countries considered.  
 
Since 1985 the average elasticity of electricity consumption to GDP in the European 
Union has been around 1 (Annual Energy Review, 1999). However, this mean value 
conceals great variability among the countries, from the 0.3 of Germany to the 2.9 of 
Finland. The United Kingdom showed elasticity near to the EU average; while in Italy 
and France it was almost double (1.9). Per capita consumption was almost 5,000 kWh 
in Italy (1997), 6,100 kWh in the UK, 6,600 kWh in Germany, 7,400 kWh in France, 
reaching the continental maximum of 16,540 kWh in Sweden. The table below shows 
the growth rates of final demand for electricity in the countries considered (Tab. 1). 
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Table 1 – Average annual growth rates in final demand and in energy consumption  
per capita in some countries (%) 
 Final demand Per capita consumption  
 1985-1990 1990-1997 1985-1990 1990-1997 
France 3.6 2.3 2.5 1.8 
Germany 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Italy 4.3 2.1 3.8 1.8 
Sweden 1.2 0.5 0.8 0.3 
UK 2.5 1.7 1.9 1.0 
EU 2.7 1.8 2.2 1.2 
Source:our calulations on data from  Annual Energy Review, EU, 1999 
 
3.1 Prices 
With regard to prices in the first analysis we consider the average prices of electricity 
(including taxes) for business and domestic users. We shall also show the cost trends for 
some energy inputs. 
Figures 2 to 6 show the trends in average electricity tariffs between 1985 and 1997 in 
the countries studied (data source: Annual Energy Review3). These index numbers are 
based on constant 1990 Euro. Table 1 gives the average rates of growth of prices in the 
countries studied. 
As regards the price to business users in Italy, in a regime of public monopoly and with 
an unfavourable technological mix, between 1985 and 1997 there was a drop of roughly 
25%, not that much lower than in France (30%). Despite privatisation, liberalisation and 
the change in technology, the price reduction in the United Kingdom was not a lot 
higher at 34%. In Germany price reductions were smaller at the beginning of the period, 
perhaps also due to the role still played by coal, but in the last two years they fell by 
30%, not that far from the 35% recorded in Sweden. The sharp drop in prices in 
                                                 
3 The data refer to the years 1985, 1988, 1990 and from 1992 to 1997. In order to obtain the missing data 
we carried out a simple linear interpolation between the observations available immediately before and 
after. 
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Germany is linked to the abolition of the compensation tax in 1996 (cf. supra). 
In the end, the cumulated changes in price for business users appear to be fairly even for 
all the countries studied, with a reduction in prices in the region of 30% between 1985 
and 1997, albeit with different time profiles. 
It is also interesting to compare the costs of the inputs, which fell far more than the 
prices of electricity in all countries. 
For example, the price of natural gas fell by about 60% in France, roughly 55% in 
Germany, 70% in UK and 42% in Italy. The price of diesel oil fell by around 60% in all 
countries with a peak of 70% in Germany and a minimum of 53% in Italy.  
Looking at domestic consumers, the reduction in price in Germany was much lower for 
them than for business users, in the region of 12%. In the United Kingdom domestic 
users saw their prices fall by 15% (half as much as the reduction for business users). In 
Italy domestic prices for electricity dropped by 10% compared to 1985, again hardly a 
generous reduction compared to business users. The French consumers obtained the 
greatest advantages, with a discount of 25%. Swedish consumers, on the other hand, 
experienced an increase of 35%. 
Thus for all the consumers in the countries considered the reduction in the prices of 
electricity for domestic use was considerably less generous than that for the business 
market, except in France (25% vs. 30% respectively). 
In the case of domestic users price trends appear to have been quite different in the 
single countries, evidence perhaps that the markets are less liberalised and competitive 
than the business supply market. 
Fig. 2a - Pric es for domestic consumption in Italy (index numbers) Fig. 2b – Pri ces for  industrial consumption in Italy (index numbers)
Fig. 3a – P rice s for domestic consumtion in the UK (index numbers) Fig. 3b - Pr ices for industrial consumption in the UK (index numbers)
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Figura 4a – Pri ces for  domestic consumption in France (index numbers) Fig. 4b – Pri ces for  industrial consumption in France (index numbers)
Fig, 5a – P rice s for dome stic consumption in Germ any (index numbers) Fig. 5b – Pri ces for  industrial consumption in Germ any (index numbers)
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Fig. 6a - Pric es for domestic consumption in Sweden (index numbers) Fig. 6b – Pri ces for industrial  consumption in Sweden ( index numbers)
Source: our elaborati on ofi Annual Ene rgy Revie w data (1997 e 1999)  
Table 2 – Average annual percent growth of electricity prices –  
Business users and domestic users – 1985-1997 
 Business users (1) Domestic users (2) 
 1990-85 1997-90 1990-85 1997-90 
France -2.9 -3.1 -2.1 -2.6 
Germany 0.0 -5.0 0.5 -1.9 
Italy -5.4 0.2 -1.4 -1.2 
UK -3.6 -3.2 -1.4 -1.2 
EU average -2.8 -3.2 -1.3 -1.2 
(1) Excluding VAT 
(2) Including VAT 
Source: our calculations on data from 1999 Annual Energy Review, EU, pp.53 and 68 
Using the index numbers we have a fairly clear idea of the price trend over the period 
considered, however, it is less clear in which countries electricity costs more and in 
which it costs less – see also Tab. 2. Table 3 offers a summary of electricity prices in 
levels. 
 
Table 3 – Electricity prices for domestic and business users in year 2000,  
net of taxes, prices in ¤/kWh at current exchange rates 
 Residential users 
(weighted average per class) 
Residential users 
(simple average per class) 
France 0,10 0,06 
Germany 0,14 0,082 
Italy 0,131 0,09 
UK  0,129 0,084 
Sweden 0,083 0,04 
EU average (weighted on 
consumption) 
0,11 0,07 
Source: Our calculations on Molinari (2001) and Eurostat data 
 
As can be seen from this table, if we exclude Sweden and France where the prices are 
clearly lower than the European average, presumably due to the technology used, the 
prices in Germany, Italy and the UK are not that different from one another, despite the 
enormous structural differences. 
Lastly, we shall now consider the data as a ratio of the real price (net of inflation). 
The data for 1990-97 from the International Energy Agency (and published by the 
OECD), are expressed in terms of real average price and are given in the Table 4 below. 
We have also listed the Annual Energy Review figures for the same time horizon. 
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Table 4 – 1997 index of average price in real terms, 1990=100 
Domestic users Business users Country 
IEA AER IEA AER 
Italy 106 107 109 101 
Germany  83 87 81 70 
France 89 83 96 80 
UK  91 92 72 79 
Average for 20 
European countries 
105 - 90 - 
Source: Paniccia (1999) on IEA data and our processing of  
Annual Energy Review data (1999) 
As we can see in Table 4, the figures from the two sources are far from being identical 
and show the greatest anomalies for business users. 
 
Eurostat uses an alternative method of sampling and refers to the price per typical 
consumer.  
Table 5 takes the figures published in Energy Prices for the period 1985-1998, 
calculating the appropriate indices for domestic users. We shall consider a typical user 
with an annual consumption of 3,500 kWh. The figures are gross of indirect taxes and 
as a control for each country we have taken three series: in local currency, in ECU and 
in PPP.  
For reasons of comparability we shall limit the comparison to the domestic tariffs and to 
three countries: France, Germany and the UK.  
 
Table 5 - Indices (1985=100) of spending for electricity  
for a typical domestic user (annual consumption  
of 3,500 kWh – July 1998) 
Country ECU Local currency PPP 
UK  119 119 110 
Germany 125 111 122 
France  110 107 111 
Source: Energy Prices, Eurostat 
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The table shows that for this type of domestic user spending had increased since 1985 in 
all three countries considered, although there was no obvious pattern.  
 
Paniccia (1999) carried out a comparative analysis for Italy, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom for the period 1990-1998 following the “typical consumer” method. 
The conclusions she reached were the following: 
- for smaller domestic users (1,200 kWh) tariffs in Italy fell by 30%, compared to a 
reduction of 5%-10% in the other three countries; 
- for average domestic users (3,500 kWh) tariffs in Italy rose by 30%, (whereas they 
were stable in the other countries)4; 
- for small business users (160 MWh) and for medium-large users (24 GWh) prices 
dropped sharply all over (although less sharply in Italy); 
- for the largest business users (50 GWh) in Germany prices dropped by 25%, in Italy 
and France they fell by 5%, and in the UK they rose by 4%. 
 
In Italy the price structure was progressive for domestic users (for a consumer of 600 
kWh annually the price is the lowest in Europe), while it is regressive in the other 
countries. Volume discounts are granted to those who consume more, according to a 
scheme, which is also used in Italy for business users.  
 
From what we have said one notices how important it is to pay attention to the different 
methods of sampling and the various sources of statistics.  
In this paper, however, we are less interested in carrying out an absolute comparison 
among the countries, and more interested in trying to understand to what extent the 
performance of prices and, more generally, the change in the welfare of the consumer, is 
                                                 
4 This was probably due to special protection offered by law to some “non conventional” independent 
generators. 
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linked to privatisation and to the liberalisation of the electricity market. In the following 
paragraph we take a closer look at this problem using different analysis techniques. 
 
3.2 Empirical analysis  
This section is  the core of the paper and is divided into three parts: 
- firstly we shall attempt to explain the trend in electricity prices on the basis of the 
trend in the prices of productive inputs; 
- then we shall try to verify the existence of a relationship between the trend in prices 
and other significant variables: consumption, the structure of the sector, the 
productive mix; 
- lastly, we shall try to verify the incidence of sector liberalisation on the welfare of 
consumers through a simple calculation of the Marshallian surplus. 
 
a) Electricity  prices and energy input costs  
It is not easy to define an unambiguous acceptable method to determine how much the 
structure of the sector (more or less marked liberalisation), influences the performance 
of prices.  
A first approach, albeit crude, could be that of studying how much the cost of 
productive factors influences the price of electricity. If one founds a strong correlation 
between the above-mentioned variables, one could hypothesise that the mark-up 
remains constant regardless of the ownership regime and market competition. This type 
of analysis certainly does not allow one to directly verify the relationship between the 
degree of liberalisation of the market and prices, but it does constitute a first indirect 
check. It is worth pointing out that the raw materials taken into consideration (coal, gas 
and diesel oil) are those most commonly used for the generation of electricity and, 
consequently, this analysis could bring less satisfactory results for countries with a high 
percentage of nuclear in the productive mix (France). 
Below we shall try to analyse what happens in the single countries and then make a 
more general comparison. The data used are the same as those presented in Tables 2 to 
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5 and refer to the period from 1985 to 1997 (remember that we carried out a linear 
interpolation for the missing figures, cf. note 2). We use the notation “average cost” to 
indicate a weighted average of the price of productive inputs. The weights used to 
achieve the average are equal to the percentage claimed by each of the inputs in the 
production of electricity in each of the countries studied (with 100 being the sum of the 
three productive factors5). 
Almost everywhere electricity prices are strongly correlated to those of energy inputs 
(more so for business users than for domestic ones6). The price of coal shows the closest 
correlation to movements in electricity prices in all countries, for both domestic and 
business users. For the former the correlation coefficient never falls below 0.65 and is 
more important than other factors in Germany, whereas in France the coefficient is 
higher than it is for gas, and in the UK it is the same as gas. For industrial users the 
coefficient varies from 0.88 (Italy) to 0.96 (Germany) and it is most important for 
France and Germany, but in the UK it is overtaken by gas and in Italy by diesel oil and 
gas. In five out of seven cases the average price is between first and second position, 
but, above all, it never falls below 0.63 for domestic users and below 0.78 for business 
users. The results obtained thus confirm that there is a strong relationship between the 
prices of the inputs and those of electricity.  
The analysis carried out so far can be subjected to two important criticisms. The first 
refers to the sample, which, from the point of view of a correlation analysis, could be 
scarcely representative. The second to the possibility that the use of linear interpolation 
for the unavailable data artificially increases the value of the correlation indices or, in 
any case, invalidates the results by altering the relative position of the productive inputs 
in terms of capacity to explain the performance of electricity prices. 
                                                 
5 The data referring to the weight of the inputs were taken from the Annual Energy Review (1999). Values 
are available for the years 1985, 1988, 1990 and from 1995 to 1997. The missing data were obtained by a 
linear interpolation of the closest available data. 
6 For a detailed country by country analysis and for the correlation tables see section A.1 of the statistical 
appendix. 
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As far as the first problem is concerned, since we do not have access to any more 
complete databases, we can only bear this in mind and use our results with prudence. 
On the other hand, the literature on the same subject refers – with apparent confidence – 
to the same sample that we considered (see, amongst others, Steiner, 2000). 
With regard to the second question posed above, we shall now repeat the previous 
tables with the unavailable data calculated as missing values (thus eliminating the linear 
interpolation) and we shall comment on any possible differences compared to 
previously. 
 
Table 6 – Domestic users – Classification of the inputs according to the  
correlation with electricity prices 
 1 2 3 4 
Italy Gas Diesel - - 
UK Average Price Coal Gas Diesel 
France Gas Average Price Coal Diesel 
Germany Average Price Coal Gas Diesel 
Sweden Diesel - - - 
 
Table 7 – Business users - Classification of the inputs according to the  
correlation with electricity prices 
 1 2 3 4 
Italy Gas Coal Average Price Diesel 
UK Average Price Gas Coal Diesel 
France Coal Gas Average Price Diesel 
Germany Average Price Coal Diesel Gas 
Sweden Diesel - - - 
Source: our processing of Annual Energy Review data (1997 and 1999)    
 
If we compare tables 8 and 6 we find that, for domestic users, there was no change in 
the relative positions of the different productive factors in any country. It should be 
noted, however, that there was a net relative improvement in both the UK and Germany 
in the correlation between the weighted average price of input and the price of 
electricity. In fact, in these countries this value jumps from third and second positions, 
respectively, to first in the comparison of single productive factors. 
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If we compare tables 9 and 7 we find that, for business users, the relative positions of 
the different inputs change only for Italy where the situation passes from the old (1 
Diesel, 2 Gas and 3 Coal) to the new order (1 Gas, 2 Coal and 3 Diesel). 
Moreover, in all countries there was a change in the relative positions of the average 
price (from first to third in Italy, from second to first in the UK and Germany, from 
fourth to third in France). 
We may conclude that the interpolation of the missing data did not invalidate the 
previous conclusions.  
 
Table 8 – Simple correlation (r) between  tariffs (residential users)  
and energy  inputs costs. 
 Italy UK France Germany Sweden 
Coal - 0.652 0.866 0.827 - 
Diesel 0.290 0.556 0.787 0.140 0.563 
Gas 0.534 0.645 0.920 0.253 - 
Average cost - 0.630 0.871 0.767 - 
Source: our on calculations on data from Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) 
 
Table 9- Simple correlation (r) between  tariffs ( business users)  
and energy  inputs costs. 
 Italy UK France Germany Sweden 
Coal 0.885 0.953 0.937 0.960 - 
Diesel 0.962 0.695 0.802 0.433 0.938 
Gas 0.936 0.975 0.847 0.403 - 
Average cost 0.967 0.953 0.782 0.833 - 
Source: our on calculations on data from Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) 
 
 
Table 10 - Simple correlation of electricity prices  
(residential users) across countries   
 Italy UK France Germany Sweden 
Italy 1.000 0.399 0.031 -0.394 0.088 
UK 0.399 1.000 0.745 0.501 -0.685 
France 0.031 0.745 1.000 0.772 -0.935 
Germany -0.394 0.501 0.772 1.000 -0.898 
Sweden 0.088 -0.685 -0.935 -0.898 1.000 
Source: our on calculations on data from Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) 
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Table 11 - Simple correlation of electricity prices (business  
users) across countries 
 Italy UK France Germany Sweden
Italy 1.000 0.641 0.700 0.269 0.494 
UK 0.641 1.000 0.961 0.882 0.859 
France 0.700 0.961 1.000 0.863 0.910 
Germany 0.269 0.882 0.863 1.000 0.888 
Sweden 0.494 0.859 0.910 0.888 1.000 
Source: our calculations on Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) 
 
b) Electricity prices and other structural variables 
This analysis took its cue from an attempt in Paniccia (1999) to verify the relationship 
between the price of electricity and the following variables:  
- the type of equipment used to produce electricity (productive mix);  
- total electricity consumption; 
- average electricity consumption per inhabitant;  
- index of sector concentration. 
Paniccia calculates the simple correlation coefficient between average electricity prices 
(source IEA) and above-mentioned variables for 1996 (the concentration index is the 
only one that refers to 1997). The study is carried out taking into account the 15 
countries of the European Union plus Norway and Switzerland. We repeat this analysis 
for 1997 taking the prices from two different sources (IEA and the Annual Energy 
Review). 
In table 12 we show the updated data for 1997 for some of the countries and in table 13 
a summary of the results achieved when considering all 17 countries.  
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Table 12 – Production per type of plant and degree of concentration of the market, total 
consumption and consumption per inhabitant in some EU countries and in Norway (1997) 
 Type of generating plant Degree of 
concentration 
of the market  
Total 
consumption  
Consumpt. 
per 
inhabitant 
 Nucl Fossil Hydro Other Total    
 % % % % GWh % % GWh % kWh 
France 78.2 7.9 13.9 0 481,000 100 0.85 380,700 16.7 6,508.6 
Germany 31.7 63.4 4.1 0.8 508,300 100 0.17 480,000 21.0 5,852.8 
Italy 0 79.2 19.3 1.5 239,900 100 0.63 254,100 11.1 4,422.1 
Norway 0 0.6 99.4 0 111,635 100 0.07 113,690 5.0 25,879.8 
United 
Kingdom  
26.6 46.0 0.7 26.7 326,066 100 0.22 301,004 13.2 5,110.0 
Sweden 46.2 6.6 47.1 0.1 144,931 100 0.32 132,500 5.8 14,981.9 
Average EU 
(15) + 
Norway and 
CH 
 
33.7 
 
44.7 
 
17.5 
 
4.1 
 
2,405,079 
 
100 
 
- 
 
2280,964 
 
100 
 
5,921.7 
Source: Paniccia (1999) (concentration), Unipede (1998) (type of plants and total consumption), 
Eurostat (2000) (inhabitants). 
 
Table 13 - Simple correlation coefficients (R) between the level of prices in 17 countries and some 
explanatory variables (1996-97) 
Variable Residential users 
Paniccia 1999  IEA 1997   AER 1999 
Business users 
Paniccia 1997 IEA 1997    AER 1999 
nuclear  0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.51 -0.42 -0.47 
fossil  0.09 0.35 0.13 0.35 0.07 0.31 
hydroelectric  -0.14 -0.38 -0.11 0.21 0.39 0.11 
Degree of concentration (*) -0.10 0.19 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 
Total consumption  0.13 0.08 0.10 0.08 -0.09 0.06 
Consumption per inhab. -0.44 -0.66 -0.28 -0.64 -0.55 -0.42 
(*) measured with a Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
Source: Paniccia (1999) (concentration), Unipede (1998) (type of plants and total consumption), Eurostat (2000) 
(inhabitants), IEA (2000) and the Annual Energy  Review (1999) (prices). 
As we can see the correlation between the level of prices and market concentration is 
very low. In general for business users where the market is probably more competitive, 
technological variables, which in turn determine costs, are much more important than 
concentration of supply. The consumption per inhabitant variable, on the other hand, is 
an indication of the persistence of scale economies and of agglomeration. Besides, a 
comparison between the price trends for domestic and business users shows that the 
latter benefit considerably more from the dynamics of falling costs and the increasing 
doses of liberalisation, even if the lower costs are not always transferred integrally.  
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At this point we shall again restrict our analysis to Italy, the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. The objective is to verify whether the results reached with the method 
used by Paniccia are also confirmed when following a simple econometric approach. 
As usual, the aim is to verify which factors are more important than others in 
determining price levels in the electricity sector. 
The variables considered are: type of generating plants, total consumption, average 
consumption and a variable of market structure, with the addition, however, of the 
prices of productive inputs.  
As regards the types of generating plants, we use the following definitions: 
 Tot. Q. The total amount of electricity produced (indices); 
 Q. Hydro. The amount of electricity produced hydroelectric plants (indices); 
 Q. Nuc. The amount of electricity produced nuclear plants (indices); 
 Q. Foss. The amount of electricity produced by fossil fuel plants (indices). 
 
For consumer variables we have used: 
 Tot. Cons. Total electricity consumption (indices); 
 Av. Cons. Average electricity consumption per inhabitant (indices). 
 
The variables related to the prices of productive inputs are: 
 Coal P. The price of coal (indices); 
 Gas P. The price of gas (indices); 
 Diesel P. The price of diesel for domestic users (indices). 
 
As regards the magnitude of the structure of the market, in each case the one of the 
following that gave the most significant results was used7: 
                                                 
7 The data are those from the OECD International Regulation Database also used in Steiner (2000) and 
which can be found on the Internet at  http://www.oecd.org/subject/regdatabase. For a more detailed 
description of them see Steiner (2000) section 3.3. 
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 Liberalisation; 
 Expected time before liberalisation (Time liberal.); 
 Privatisation; 
 Expected time before privatisation; 
 Degree of private ownership; 
 Possibility of access to the network by third parties (TPA); 
 Degree of vertical integration between generation and transmission; 
 Degree of vertical integration between generation and supply; 
 Presence of an electricity market; 
 Ways of regulating prices. 
The method used for this is a regression analysis with "pooled data", a mixture of cross 
section and time series techniques. The period considered is from 1989 to 1997. 
 
First and foremost, we note that in one country (Italy) the quantity of electricity 
produced by nuclear plants over the period studied is zero. This means that when we 
include the quantity produced by nuclear plants variable in the regression we lose the 
information pertaining to Italy. It is therefore necessary to divide the study into two 
parts: with and without Italy, according to whether or not we include the quantity of 
electricity generated by nuclear plants. 
The econometric analysis8 confirms that the relationship between the prices of 
electricity and those of productive inputs is stronger for business users than for domestic 
consumers (for the former two productive inputs enter the regression compared to only 
one for the latter). This result is in line with those obtained when analysing the 
correlation. 
 
Tab. 14 – Residential users tariffs. Linear regression  
 1 – Without Italy 2 – Without  Italy 1 – With Italy 
 Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat 
Constant 51.931 1.490 87.898 2.593 128.633 8.555 
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 Gas Price 0.857 4.156 0.582 3.197 0.229 3.503 
Total quantity 0.421 2.992 0.454 2.972 0.273 2.043 
Nuclear. 0.106 1.556 0.004 0.075   
Hydro -0.034 -0.493 -0.132 -2.246 -0.105 -1.316 
Average consumption -0.805 -6.652 -0.742 -5.761 -0.716 -5.417 
Liberalization  (years 
expected  to) -0.705 -2.260     
       
R sq.  0.855  0.818  0.515 
R sq.adj.  0.812  0.775  0.452 
Source: Our estimation on data from Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) prices and input costs), 
Unipede (1998) (technology and total consumption), Eurostat (2000) (population), 
OECD(2000) (other structural variables) 
 
Tab. 15 – Business users tariffs. Linear regression  
 1 – Without  Italy 2 – Without Italy 1 – With Italy 2 – With Italy 
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 86.089 3.963 89.939 3.665 79.288 5.548 74.903 5.258 
Coal Price 0.221 4.059 0.262 4.421 0.231 4.258 0.270 5.566 
Gas Price 0.550 3.652 0.369 2.446 0.429 3.649 0.348 3.289 
Total output 0.024 0.182 0.177 1.312 0.074 0.578 0.046 0.358 
Hydro -0.112 -1.519 -0.181 -2.338 -0.100 -1.444 -0.096 -1.370 
Nuclear 0.177 1.910 0.017 0.214     
Thermal     0.023 0.528 0.050 1.250 
Average 
consumption -0.605 -4.367 -0.451 -3.187 -0.336 -2.607 -0.270 -2.192 
Liberalization 
(expected year  
to) 
-0.823 -2.576   -0.298 -1.464   
         
R sq  0.899  0.864  0.845  0.833 
R sq  adj   0.862  0.823  0.807  0.799 
Source: Our estimation on data from Annual Energy Review (1997 e 1999) prices and input costs;  
Unipede (1998) technology and total consumption, Eurostat (2000) population, OECD (2000) other 
structural variables. 
 
Furthermore, the results obtained are very close to the conclusions reached by Paniccia 
(1999) regarding the inverse relationship between electricity prices and average 
consumption per inhabitant.  
On the other hand, there are differences in the conclusions regarding the relationship 
between electricity prices and the variables in the productive mix. In the correlation 
study strong evidence of an inverse relationship between the quantity of nuclear energy 
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produced and the price of electricity was found, especially for business users. In the 
econometric analysis, on the other hand, after having controlled for other variables, it 
would appear to be the quantity of hydroelectric energy produced that has an inverse 
relationship with the price of electricity even though the evidence is not very strong.  
The most important result of our study, however, is that the two different methods reach 
the same conclusion regarding the absence (during the period covered by the data 
considered) of any relationship between industry structure and the price of electricity. In 
table 16 we summarise the results obtained by each of the methods of analysis 
(correlation and regression), classifying some factors according to their importance in 
interpreting the price of electricity (low = 3, medium = 2, high = 1). The factors 
considered are the price of productive inputs (Input P.), the average consumption per 
inhabitant (Av. Cons.), total consumption (Tot. Cons.), the quantity of hydroelectric 
energy produced (Q. Hydro), the quantity of nuclear energy produced (Q. Nuc.) and the 
structure of the sector (Sect. Struc.). 
 
Table 16 – Importance of some factors in explaining the price of electricity  
Variable Input P. Average. 
Consumption. 
Total. 
Consumption. 
Q. Hydro Q. Nuc. Ind. Struc.  
     corr reg  
Domestic medium high low medium low low low 
Business high high low medium high low low 
 
c) Changes in welfare 
Lastly, in this section, we attempt – for purely illustrative purposes - a simple 
calculation of the Marshallian surplus as an average of the Laysperes and Paasche 
indices (see Hancock, Waddams Price 1997, Florio 2004). 
We build on Waddams Price, Hancok (1998) and propose some simple partial 
equilibrium formulas on consumers’ welfare change. For a linear Marshallian demand 
and its compensated and equivalent counterparts, at privatization, time 1, we observe 
quantity x1 and price p1. At an arbitrary horizon, time 2, we observe quantity x2 and 
price p2. These observations lie on the Marshallian demand function. A complication 
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arises when we have demand shifts, e.g. because of exogenous income change or 
because changes of consumers’ preferences. We ignore this point here. 
The compensated demand intersects the Marshallian demand at point x1,p1. It takes 
value x3 at p2, where x2>x3>x1 because the slope of the compensated demand is greater 
than the Marshallian demand. We assume that privatized companies produce normal 
goods. The equivalent demand intersects the Marshallian demand at point p2,x2 and 
takes value x4 at p1, and x2>x4>x3>x1. 
The Marshallian welfare change caused by price change is 
M = x1 (p1-p2)+ (p1-p2) (x2-x1)/2 
or 
M = (p1-p2)(x1+x2)/2 
 
The Laysperes, Paasche compensated, equivalent variations are respectively: 
L = x1 (p1-p2) 
P = x2 (p1-p2) 
CV = (p1-p2)(x1+x3)/2 
EV = (p1-p2)(x2+x4)/2 
Since x1<x3<x4<x2, it follows that L<CV<M<EV<P (see Waddams Price, Hancock, 
1998 for a simple graphical presentation).  
 
We define now: E1=x1p1.   And   E2=x2p2. 
 
Then 
M = (E1-E2+p1x2-p2x1)/2 
or 
M = {E1 (1-p2/p1) + E2 (p1/p2 - 1)}/2. 
 
Note that 
P = E2 (p1/p2 - 1) 
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L = E1 (1- p2/p1). 
 
Thus we can also simply write that the Marshallian measure is an average of Paasche 
and Laysperes welfare measures. 
M = (L+P)/2. 
 
We do not need to know actual prices and quantities, we just need expenditures at 
privatization and at the final year, and the price index p2/p1. Alternatively, if we select 
an intermediate year when 
x* = (x1+x2)/2  we can directly infer the Marshallian welfare change as 
M = E* (p1-p2)/p*. 
 
where we need one midway expenditure data and two price indexes p1/p* and p2/p*.  
 
We can be confident that this measure is between EV and CV, when the assumption of 
linear demand holds and substitution effects are negligible (as they might be for low 
elasticity of demand). We can then calculate the ratio between M and the income of the 
consumer for different percentiles, and give a welfare weight to each consumer type. 
Similar reasoning applies to producer surplus, and its changes determined by changes of 
costs. 
We have shown a simplified approach to the empirical estimation of the Marshallian 
surplus. For a more general approach, with easy to implement measures, see Brau, 
Florio (2002). 
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The countries considered are again Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. 
Data refer to the years 1980 to 1998, the source IEA - Electricity Information (2000), 
and are unfortunately not comparable with the other sources mentioned. The calculation 
was made just for the domestic consumers using the figure for total consumption. Prices 
are expressed in 1990 US dollars to isolate the effects of fluctuations on the currency 
markets. The values were then converted into their equivalent purchasing power in 
order to be able to make comparisons. 
Tables 17 and 18 give the results obtained at gross prices and net of taxes. 
 
Table 17 - Marshallian surplus (prices gross of taxes) Residential users –  
1990 US Dollars*  in PPP 
 France Germany Italy UK 
1980-85 2,881 458 1,031 2,055 
1985-90 -4,771 -9,085 -2,223 -3,650 
1990-95 -1,702 -4,704 128 234 
1995-96 481 2,498 -269 -171 
1996-97 2,876 1,963 890 179 
1997-98 466 0 126 541 
*million 
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Source: our processing of  IEA - Electricity Information data (2000) 
 
Table 18 - Marshallian surplus (prices net of taxes) Residential users –  
1990 US Dollars* in PPP 
 France Germany Italy UK 
1980-85 2,398 452 1,119 2,055 
1985-90 -4,012 -7,123 -987 -3,650 
1990-95 -968 -3,643 -173 987 
1995-96 629 708 -80 -145 
1996-97 2,205 1,679 744 75 
1997-98 374 211 266 347 
*million 
Source: our processing of  IEA - Electricity Information data (2000) 
With this set of data we note that after privatisation (1990) in the United Kingdom the 
increase in welfare was lower than in France and not very far from that in Italy, despite 
the fact that the electricity sector had not yet been liberalised in France and Italy.  
From what we have said, it is quite clear that it is not possible in this study to infer a 
precise relationship between the liberalisation of the sector and the change in social 
welfare, or a clear superiority of one model of industrial organisation over another. 
Scale economies and input mix dominates on liberalisation as explanatory variables per 
prices. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We feel that the case of electricity is a significant and enlightening one from the point of 
view of the more general problems mentioned at the beginning of this work.  
We have considered output, consumption, prices and consumers’ welfare changes over 
more than a decade in four countries, with very different industry structures. 
The available data do not yet allow us to establish which regulatory model and 
allocation of property rights best protect the consumer from the market power, which in 
sectors such as electricity, is still a prerogative of the producers and distributors. This is 
the story told by a study of prices (and quantities). One ingredient of a future critical 
reading of public policies in this field is a careful monitoring of the trends in prices and 
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in users’ spending, combined with observation over time and an international 
comparison. This monitoring should not be seen as an end in itself, but as a basis for 
systematic calculations (ex-ante and ex-post) of the changes in welfare brought about by 
the reforms. 
 In such a perspective it would be desirable - in the absence of a strong European 
regulator - that an agreement be reached by the national regulators regarding the 
measurement of prices and consumption in the European Union member states, which 
would allow calculations of the type suggested here to be made, obviously in a more 
sophisticated and comprehensive form.  
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